Supreme Court ruling lowers the bar for stripping returning green card holders of their resident status at the border

The US Supreme Court ruled 6-3 on June 23, 2026 that border agents need only a "reason to believe" a green card holder committed a qualifying crime to treat them as a person seeking admission to the United States rather than as a returning resident. The decision, written by Justice Clarence Thomas and joined by the five other conservative justices, lowers the evidentiary standard that had previously required the government to show "clear and convincing evidence" of a crime before making that reclassification at the border. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined by the two remaining liberal justices, dissented — describing the ruling as giving the government "a massive blank check" to erode the protections of permanent residency.

Why the "seeking admission" classification matters

Under US immigration law, a lawful permanent resident — a green card holder — who leaves the US and returns is treated as a returning resident, not as someone entering the country for the first time. That distinction carries legal weight. A returning resident has an established right to re-enter, and if the government wants to remove them, the burden is on the government to prove they are deportable. But a person classified as "seeking admission" has a different legal footing: they must prove their own admissibility, the government can detain them pending a decision, and their green card can be confiscated at the border. Congress specified certain circumstances in which a returning green card holder can be reclassified as seeking admission — one of those circumstances is if they have "committed" a crime involving moral turpitude. The question in Blanche v. Lau was how much evidence border agents need to make that reclassification on the spot.

The case

The case arose from the 2012 return of Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen who held a US green card, to JFK after a trip to China. At the time he arrived, Lau was facing pending trademark counterfeiting charges in New Jersey — charges that had not yet resulted in a conviction or plea. Border agents, aware of the pending charges, declined to admit him as a returning resident and instead placed him on parole — a mechanism that technically permits someone to enter the country physically while their admissibility is still being determined. After Lau later pleaded guilty to the NJ charges and received a sentence, the government initiated removal proceedings on the ground that he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The underlying legal fight that eventually reached the Supreme Court turned on a threshold question: when Lau landed at JFK in 2012, did border agents have the authority to treat him as seeking admission based on pending charges that had not yet been proven?

Old standard vs new standard

Before Blanche v. Lau, federal circuit courts had diverged on what evidence border agents needed to reclassify a returning green card holder as seeking admission. Courts that had addressed the question had generally required "clear and convincing evidence" — a demanding standard that requires more than a preponderance but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court rejected that standard. Under the ruling, the government needs only a "reason to believe" a qualifying crime occurred. That is a substantially lower bar — it does not require a conviction, a plea, or even formal charges. The court also held that the government does not need to establish all of its evidence at the port of entry; the evidentiary picture can be built during the removal proceedings that follow the reclassification. The combination means that a border agent who is aware of pending charges, an arrest record, or other indicators of a possibly qualifying crime can reclassify a returning green card holder on the spot, and the government can then develop its case in subsequent proceedings.

Who is most directly affected

Immigration attorneys who analyzed the ruling on June 23–24 identified four overlapping categories of green card holders who now face meaningfully higher risk when returning from international travel. Green card holders with currently pending criminal charges face the sharpest increase in exposure — their situation is almost exactly the scenario in Blanche v. Lau. Green card holders with prior convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude — a category that covers fraud, theft, assault, certain drug offenses, and other serious crimes — face ongoing risk because a conviction is itself a "reason to believe" the crime occurred. Green card holders with dismissed charges or resolved matters that did not result in a conviction are also at elevated risk under the new standard, since a "reason to believe" does not require a final outcome. Finally, green card holders with expunged or sealed records involving qualifying offenses are in an uncertain position, since the legal effect of expungement on federal immigration proceedings has always been limited — consult an immigration attorney for advice specific to your record. The ruling does not change what crimes are disqualifying — it changes how easily border agents can make that determination at the port of entry.

What green card holders should do before traveling internationally

If you hold a US green card and have any criminal history — including arrests that did not result in conviction, charges that were dismissed, or expunged records — you should speak with an immigration attorney before any international travel. This is not new advice, but the ruling in Blanche v. Lau makes the risk more immediate by lowering what border agents need to act. An attorney can assess whether any matter in your history involves a crime that could be characterized as moral turpitude, and advise on how to approach a potential secondary inspection. Green card holders with no criminal history and no pending legal matters are not directly affected by this ruling — the reclassification mechanism only applies when there is something in a person's record that could constitute a qualifying crime. The ruling does not change the substantive immigration categories; it changes the procedural moment at which the government can act on them.